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ABSTRACT 
This paper builds on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(1999) to take a closer look at intermediate-term momentum trading strategies for 
industry groups. Specifically, it is found that: momentum trading strategies for 
industry groups are significantly more profitable when we include more industries in  
the universe and purchaselsell fewer winningllosing industries i n  the strategy; the 
winner and loser portfolios are made up of cyclical industries; industry momentum 
peaks after a total time period (evaluation period plus holding period) of thirteen to 
fourteen months, regardless of the number of industries examined; returns to 
momentum trading strategies vary significantly throughout the year, and June and 
December are by far the most significant months for momentum profits; and, the 
winners momentum portfolio outperforms the market i n  6 out of 9 bear markets during 
the sample period, even though this strategy i s  perceived as much riskier because of 
industry concentration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper builds on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(1999) to take a closer look at intermediate-term momentum trading strategies as 
explained by industry groups. First, I show that the profitability of momentum trading 
strategies varies significantly with: (1) the portion of industries included in the 
winners and losers portfolios; and ( 2 )  the number of industries included in the 
universe. Second, I show that some industries appear in the winner and loser 
portfolios much more frequently than others, and that the industries that are most 
often featured in the winner and loser momentum portfolios are industries commonly 
referred to as 'cyclical'. Third, I show that industry momentum peaks after a total 
time period (evaluation period plus holding period) of thirteen to fourteen months, 
regardless of the number of industries examined and the length of the evaluation 
period. Fourth, I show that returns to the momentum trading strategies vary 
significantly throughout the year, and that June and December are by far the most 
significant months for momentum profits. Finally, I show that a zero-cost 
intermediate-term industry momentum trading strategy performs much differently in 
'bear' markets than it does in 'bull' markets, and i s  surprisingly stable in times of 
market crisis. Further, the winners momentum portfolio outperforms the market in 6 
out of 9 bear markets during the sample period, even though this strategy i s  perceived 
as much riskier because of industry concentration. 
While intermediate-term momentum trading strategies have been a hot topic 
amongst investment managers for decades, it i s  only in the past decade or so that the 
academic community has accepted intermediate-term momentum as a consistently 
observable factor that has strong implications for the concept of market efficiency. 
Technical analysts have been looking at intermediate-term momentum as an element 
of their trading strategies for years. In fact, the 'primary trend' concept developed by 
Charles Dow around the end of the 19th century i s  based on the idea that a stock wil l  
remain in a general uptrend or downtrend for a few months to a few years at a time.' 
More recently, Gerald Appel's Moving Average Convergence Divergence ("MACD") 
technical indicator has been used by thousands of technical analysts to  judge stock, 
industry or broad-market index m ~ m e n t u m . ~  Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) 
find that 77% of the 155 mutual funds studied were 'momentum investors' during the 
1975-1984 time period, buying stocks that were past winners (most did not 
systematically sell stocks that were past losers). Further, the authors find that, on 
average, funds that invested on momentum realized significantly better performance 
than other funds. However, it should be noted that this study's limited time period 
may have a significant effect on the results, and that we may not be able to apply 
similar conclusions to  other time periods. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reveal both the statistical and economic 
significance and the consistency of profits obtainable from intermediate-term 
momentum trading strategies. The authors examine data for NYSE and AMEX 
individual stocks over the 1965 to  1989 sample period and report the return results for 
the following trading strategy: 
Rank stocks into deciles based on their returns for various lag periods; 
Buy the winning decile of stocks/sell the losing decile of stocks; and 
' Source: http: //stockcharts.com/education/MarketAnalysis/dowtheo1 .html 
' Source: http: 1 1stockcharts.comleducationl IndicatorAnalysislindic-MACD1 . html 
Hold these portfolios for various hold periods. 
The authors equal-weight the stocks in  the winner and loser portfolios and focus on 
the profits obtained from portfolios that were rebalanced monthly to maintain equal 
weights. The authors find statistically significant monthly returns as high as 1.31% 
(16.90% annual) for the zero-cost strategy that ranks stocks on their past 12-month 
returns, purchases the winning portfoliolsells the losing portfolio and holds for 3 
months. The authors identify three potential sources of relative strength profits: the 
cross-sectional dispersion in  expected returns, serial covariance of the momentum 
factor and the average serial covariance of the idiosyncratic components of security 
returns. The authors reject the first two of these potential sources of relative 
strength profits, and also reject a lead-lag effect (originally proposed by Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990) as a potential source for the average serial covariance of the 
idiosyncratic components of security returns. They subsequently conclude that the 
profitability of intermediate-term momentum trading strategies i s  therefore related to  
market underreaction to firm-specific information. The authors find that the 
profitability of short-term momentum strategies i s  not confined to any particular sub- 
sample of stocks, as measured by firm size and ex ante estimates of beta (two 
commonly accepted measures of risk and expected returns). However, the results 
indicate that, on average, firms held in  the winner and loser portfolios tend to  be 
smaller i n  size and have higher betas than firms that are held in  the non-winnerlloser 
portfolios. One of the most interesting findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is the 
complete reversal of short-term momentum profitability i n  the month of January. In 
fact, the 6-monthl6-month momentum trading strategy loses about 7.0% on average i n  
January but achieves positive abnormal returns in each of the other months (the 
average return i n  non-January months is 1.66% per month). The economic significance 
of the January reversal i s  huge: a trading strategy that reversed the buy and sell 
portfolios in  January would achieve 25.0% per year in abnormal (zero-cost) returns. In 
addition, the authors find the January reversal i s  by far strongest in the smallest third 
of stocks, and is  strongly inversely related to firm size. Another key finding of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) i s  that the cumulative return of the trading strategy that 
buys winnerslsells losers based on their past 6-month performance i s  negative i n  the 
first month, peaks in holding month 12 and holds positive out to month 36 (and 
potentially beyond). This finding of negative return in the first holding month i s  
important to note because it i s  not consistent with studies of industry momentum (vs. 
individual stock momentum). Finally, the authors back-test the momentum trading 
strategy for the periods 1927-1940 and 1941 -1964. They find the 6-month lag strategy 
i s  unable to generate a cumulative positive return in  the 1927-1940 period, and 
explain that this i s  the result of the significant 'back-and-forth' volatility that was 
experienced i n  the market at this time, without any significant sustained uptrends or 
downtrends. However, the results for the 1941 -1 964 time period are very similar to 
the results for the 1965-1989 time period, with the exception of the cumulative 
returns disappearing by holding month 24. The authors note 
the evidence of initial positive and later negative relative strength 
returns suggests that common interpretations of return reversals as 
evidence of overreaction and return persistence (i.e. momentum) as 
evidence of underreaction are probably overly simplistic. 
They conjecture that i t ' s  possible that the market underreacts to information about 
the short-term prospects of firms but overreacts to information about their long-term 
prospects, thereby causing intermediate-term momentum and long-term mean 
reversion (long-term mean reversion i s  well-documented in  De Bondt and Thaler, 
1995). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) take a closer look at the source of short-term 
contrarian profits. This study builds on the finding of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
that returns to intermediate-term momentum strategies are negative in  the first 
month, i.e. prices exhibit short-term reversal. The authors posit two sources of short- 
term contrarian profits: delayed stock price reaction to common factors (the lead-lag 
effect) and overreaction to  firm-specific information. The results of their tests 
indicate that stock prices on average react with a delay to  common factors, but 
overreact to firm-specific information. The find, however, that the delayed reactions 
contribute l i t t le to contrarian profits, and that most of the short-horizon contrarian 
profits arise because of the tendency of stock prices to  overreact to firm-specific 
information. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) relate the evidence on momentum in  
stock prices to  the evidence on the market's underreaction to earnings-related and 
other information. They note that studies have found that firms reporting 
unexpectedly high earnings outperform firms reporting unexpectedly poor earnings. 
The superior performance persists over a period of about six months after earnings 
announcements. The authors put forward the following: 
1. The profitability of momentum strategies may be due to the component of 
medium-horizon returns that is related to earnings-related news. If this 
explanation i s  true, then momentum strategies wil l not be profitable after 
accounting for past innovations in  earnings and earnings forecasts. 
2. The profitability of momentum strategies stems from overreaction induced 
by positive-feedback trading strategies, i.e. that 'trend-chasers' reinforce 
movements in  stock prices even in  the absence of fundamental information, 
so that the returns for past winners and losers are (at least partly) 
temporary in  nature. Under this explanation, they expect that past winners 
and losers wil l subsequently experience reversals in  their stock prices. 
3. Strategies based either on past returns or on earnings surprises (earnings 
momentum) exploit market under-reaction to different pieces of 
information. For example, an earnings momentum strategy may benefit 
from underreaction to information related to short-term earnings, while a 
price momentum strategy may benefit from the market's slow response t o  a 
broader set of information, including long-term profitability. In this case 
they would expect that each of the momentum strategies is individually 
successful, and that one effect is not subsumed by the other. 
The authors confirm that drifts in future returns over the next six and twelve months 
are predictable from a stock's prior return and from prior news about earnings. Each 
momentum variable has separate explanatory power for future returns, so one 
strategy does not subsume the other. Also, there i s  l i tt le sign of subsequent reversals 
in returns, suggesting that positive feedback trading cannot account for the 
profitability of momentum strategies. However, the authors find evidence of 
subsequent correction in prices when large, positive prior returns are not validated by 
good news about earnings. The authors also find that a substantial portion of the 
momentum effect i s  concentrated around subsequent earnings announcements. They 
conclude that the bulk of evidence thus points to  a delayed reaction of stock prices to  
the information in past returns and in  past earnings. They also note that their 
evidence that the market's response to news takes time i s  not an entirely negative 
verdict on the informational efficiency of the stock market. Prior news has aiready 
caused a substantial realignment in stock prices over the preceding period (six months 
in  this study). The past adjustment produces differences in  returns of roughly 100 
percent between the most-favourably and least-favourably affected stocks. The 
remaining adjustment that is left on the table for investors is small in comparison. 
Fama and French (1996) attempt to explain intermediate-term momentum and 
long-term reversion in stocks prices using their three-factor model, which includes the 
excess return on the market (b - RF), the return of small stocks minus large stocks 
(SMB) and the return of high-book-to-market stocks minus low-book-to-market stocks 
(HML). The three factor model finds higher excess returns for stocks that load high on 
the SMB and HML factors, i.e. stocks that are small and have high book-to-market 
ratios. They are able t o  explain long-term reversion in stock prices (skipping the year 
prior to  portfolio formation, i.e. the intermediate-term momentum period) with their 
three-factor model because long-term losers (subsequent winners) tend to have high 
factor loadings on SMB and HML and long-term winners (subsequent losers) tend to 
have low factor Loadings on SMB and HML. However, they are unable to explain 
intermediate-term momentum because intermediate-term losers (subsequent Losers) 
tend to  have high factor loadings on SMB and HML and intermediate-term winners 
(subsequent winners) tend t o  have low factors Loadings on SMB and HML. I t  i s  
important to  note that when portfolios are formed on long-term past returns that 
include the year prior to  portfolio formation (the intermediate-momentum period), 
intermediate-term continuation offsets long-term reversal, leaving either continuation 
or l i tt le pattern in  future returns. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) point out that most return-based strategies 
implemented in the literature rely exclusively on the existence of time-series patterns 
in returns. They note the following, 
Specifically, all such strategies are based on the premise that stock 
prices do not follow random walks. However, the actual profits to the 
trading strategies implemented based on past performance contain a 
cross-sectional component that would arise even i f  stock prices are 
completely unpredictable and do follow random walks. Consider, for 
example, a momentum strategy. The repeated purchase of winners 
from the proceeds of the sale of losers will, on average, be tantamount 
to  the purchase of high-mean securities from the sale of low-mean 
securities. Consequently, as long as there i s  some cross-sectional 
dispersion in the mean returns of the universe of securities, a 
momentum strategy wil l be profitable. 
However, there i s  no reason to believe a portfolio of winners is a portfolio of high- 
mean securities, i.e. there is no theoretical reason to believe that the past 
performance of a security indicates anything about its future performance. Conrad 
and Kaul's statement depends on the assumption of mean stationarity of the returns of 
individual securities during the period in which the strategies are implemented. 
However, as later studies would point out, this assumption does not hold. Conrad and 
Kaul use a single framework to analyze the sources of profits to a wide spectrum of 
return-based trading strategies implemented in the literature (including momentum 
and contrarian strategies). When they ex post condition on the return horizon of the 
strategy andlor the subperiod during which it i s  implemented, two patterns emerge 
that are consistent with the literature on returns-based trading strategies. The 
momentum strategy usually nets positive, and frequently statistically significant, 
profits at medium (3-12 month) horizons, except during the 1926-1947 subperiod, 
while a contrarian strategy i s  successful at long horizons, although the profits to  these 
strategies are statistically significant only during the 1926-1947 subperiod. 
Rouwenhorst (1 998) addresses the concern that apparent momentum anomalies 
are simply the outcome of an elaborate data snooping process by studying return 
patterns in an international context. He focuses on international medium-term return 
continuation within markets and across markets at the individual stock level using a 
sample of 2,190 stocks from 12 European countries in the period 1978 to 1995. He 
finds that an internationally diversified relative strength portfolio that invests i n  past 
medium-term winners and sells past medium-term losers earns approximately 1.0 
percent per month. This momentum in returns i s  not limited to  a particular market, 
but i s  present in all 12 markets in the sample. It holds across size deciles, although 
return continuation i s  stronger for small than large firms. The outperformance lasts 
for about one year, and cannot be attributed to  conventional measures of risk. In 
fact, controlling for market risk or exposure to a size factor increases the abnormal 
performance of relative strength strategies. However, Rouwenhorst presents some 
evidence that European and U.S. momentum strategies have a common component, 
which suggests that exposure to a common factor may drive the profitability of 
momentum strategies. He concludes that it i s  unlikely that the U.S. experience with 
momentum strategies was simply due to chance. 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) find a strong and prevalent momentum effect 
i n  industry components of stock returns which accounts for much of the individual 
stock momentum anomaly. Using the CRSP and COMPUSTAT data files (including NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq stocks), 20 value-weighted industry portfolios are formed for every 
month from July 1963 to  July 1995. The average number of stocks per industry i s  230, 
and the fewest number of stocks at any time in any industry except Railroads i s  more 
than 25 (to ensure diversification of firm-specific risk). An F-test of whether the 
sample-mean returns differ across industries is not rejected, suggesting that there is 
l i t t le cross-sectional variation in  the industry sample means. Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
build on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) by suggesting there are four sources of 
momentum trading profits from individual stocks: 
1. The cross-sectional variation in unconditional mean returns; 
2. Serial correlation in  the factor portfolios, i.e. portfolios formed on book-to- 
market, size or market beta; 
3. Serial correlation in  industry return components; and 
4. Serial covariation in  firm-specific components. 
They note that the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggestion that the serial correlation 
in  components of returns that are not related to  factors is primarily responsible for 
momentum trading profits is the equivalent of asserting that either the serial 
correlation in industry return components or the serial covariation in  firm-specific 
components, or both, generate momentum. Grinblatt and Moskowitz employ the same 
technique as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to avoid test statistics that are based on 
overlapping returns. This technique involves repeating the strategy monthly, so as to 
have multiple portfolios contributing to any one month's return. Using this technique, 
it would be wrong to attribute more than a negligible portion of any one month's 
return to bid-ask bounce (in the case of individual stock momentum) or a lead-lag 
effect (in the case of industry momentum). To begin with, the authors run an 
individual stock moment~~m strategy by sorting stocks on their past six-month returns, 
purchasing the winnins 30% of stocks and shorting the losing 30% of stocks, and holding 
this portfolio for six months. The strategy i s  repeated monthly and portfolios are 
rebalanced monthly to equal weights. This strategy generates a return (per dollar 
long) of 0.43 percent per month, which is lower but statistically more significant than 
the momentum-based portfolio return reported in  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The 
authors then move onto an industry momentum strategy. They find that sorting 
industry portfolios (which value-weight stocks within the industry) based on their past 
six-month returns, and investing equally in the top three (15%) industries while 
shorting equally the bottom three (1 5%) industries (holding this position for six 
months) produces average monthly profits of 0.43 percent - identical i n  magnitude to 
those obtained from the momentum strategy for individual equities. However, the 
authors fail to note that the proportion of industries the industry momentum strategy 
purchased and sold was smaller than the proportion of stocks the individual stock 
momentum strategy purchased and sold. We might expect that purchasing and selling 
a smaller proportion of the 'units' (stocks/industries) involved would lead to a higher 
return on the strategy (given all else is equal). Grinblatt and Moskowitz find that the 
covariance of consecutive nonoverlapping six-month returns on an equal-weighted, 
monthly rebalanced index is insignificantly different from zero. Further, none of the 
serial covariances for consecutive six-month returns of each of the three Fama and 
French (1993) factor-mimicking portfolios is significantly different from zero. Thus, 
persistence in the returns represented by the factors is not driving momentum-trading 
profits. The authors go on to  argue that the existence of industry momentum profits 
of the same magnitude as individual stock momentum profits suggests that dispersion 
in  unconditional mean returns does not drive momentum profits. The cross-sectional 
variance of ex post mean industry monthly returns is only 0.00083, which is far less 
than the estimated cross-sectional dispers!on of historical mean monthly stock returns 
of 0.01 1. Moreover, the failure to  reject an F-test that ex ante mean industry returns 
are equal suggests that the cross-sectional dispersion in  unconditional industry mean 
returns is small. They conclude that the existence of industry momentum profits, the 
absence of factor serial correlation, and negligible cross-sectional industry mean 
return dispersion implies that the serial correlation in  industry return components i s  
greater than zero. Grinblatt and Moskowitz go on to further test their results using 
various techniques, and find the following: 
lndustry portfolios exhibit significant momentum, even after controlling for 
size, book-to-market equity (BEIME), individual stock momentum, the 
cross-sectional dispersion in  mean returns and potential microstructure 
influences. 
Once returns are adjusted for industry effects, momentum profits from 
individual equities are significantly weaker and, for the most part, are 
statistically insignificant. 
lndustry momentum strategies are more profitable than individual stock 
momentum strategies. 
lndustry momentum strategies are robust to various specifications and 
methodologies (including return scrambling), and they appear to be 
profitable even among the largest, most liquid stocks. 
Profitability of industry strategies over intermediate horizons i s  
predominantly driven by the long positions. Ey contrast, the profitability of 
individual stock momentum strategies is largely driven by selling past 
losers, particularly among the less liquid stocks. 
Unlike individual momentum, industry momentum is strongest in the short 
term (at the one-month horizon) and then, like individual stock momentum, 
tends to dissipate after 12 months, eventually reversing at long horizons. 
Thus, the signs of the short-term (less than one month) performances of the 
industry and individual stock momentum strategies are completely 
opposite, yet the signs of their intermediate and long-term performances 
are identical. 
In their analysis, Grinblatt and Moskowitz note that other industry momentum trading 
strategies were employed using more industries in  the buy and sell portions of the 
strategy, and claim the results remained largely the same. However, I find that this 
conclusion i s  erroneous, and there i s  in fact a significant difference in  the results 
obtained. The authors note that Grundy and Martin (1999) have argued that industry 
momentum may be due to lead-lag effects that are not due to firm size, and point out 
that this idea i s  almost tautological. If, indeed, individual stock momentum does not 
exist intra-industry, industry momentum has to be a lead-lag effect between stocks 
within the industry. Another important finding of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) i s  
that neither the winners nor the losers portfolio seems to be dominated by a particular 
industry, and that there appears to be litt le relation between the sample mean 
returns of the industries and the frequency with which they appear i n  the winners' and 
losers' categories. However, I will show that some industries are featured much more 
frequently than other industries in the winner and loser portfolios, but that these 
industries appear frequently in  both the winners and losers portfolios. The authors 
also find that restricting securities to  the smallest 20 percent of stocks within each 
industry substantially increases the profits to the trading strategy, but that this i s  
probably due to a lead-lag effect rather than a size premium. They note that i f  
behavioural patterns generate the profitability of momentum trading strategies, then 
these strategies must at Least be constrained by factor risk exposure that cannot be 
eliminated. Such factor risk would limit the size of the positions that rational 
investors would be willing to take. They argue that because industry momentum 
drives much of individual stock momentum, and stocks within an industry tend to  be 
much more highly correlated than stocks across industries, momentum strategies are 
not very well diversified. Thus, momentum may be a 'good deal' but i s  far from an 
arbitrage. For an explanation of the source of industry momentum, Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz note the Hong and Stein (1999) suggestion that slow information diffusion 
into prices causes an initial underreaction to news, but the presence of 'momentum 
traders' seeking to exploit the slow price movement causes subsequent reversals. In 
subsequent empirical work, .Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) find that momentum i s  
stronger among small firms with low analyst coverage, which they suggest is a proxy 
for firms with slow information diffusion. Also, it may take time for news to 
disseminate among firms in an industry. Industry leaders (generally larger, more 
followed firms) might be the first to receive a piece of information, but this 
information may slowly diffuse to other firms within the industry as analysts and 
investors interpret the potential impact of the signal for the industry as a whole. This 
could create the kind of lead-lag effects among industry leaders and other firms within 
the industry (that are unrelated to microstructure or delayed common factor 
responses) that may be generating momentum. Also, Berk, Green and Naik (1999) 
demonstrate that changes in  a firm's growth options that are related to i t s  systematic 
risk can generate momentum in i t s  returns. Since growth opportunities are likely more 
correlated among firms within industries versus across industries, and likely depend on 
industry-specific attributes, it i s  conceivable that their model would generate industry 
momentum. 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) look for evidence that momentum reflects the 
gradual diffusion of firm-specific information, similar to  Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996). They posit that stocks with slower information diffusion should 
exhibit more pronounced momentum. They note that, for example, it seems plausible 
that information about small firms gets out more slowly i f  investors face fixed costs of 
information acquisition, and hence choose in  aggregate to devote more effort to 
learning about those stocks in  which they can take large positions. They admit that 
f i rm size is likely to capture other factors as well, potentially confounding their 
inferences. As an alternative proxy for the rate of information flow, they consider 
analyst coverage. They posit that stocks with lower analyst coverage should, all else 
equal, be ones where firm-specific information moves more slowly across the investing 
public. So, they check whether momentum strategies work better in low-analyst- 
coverage stocks. Again, they admit that analyst coverage is very strongly correlated 
with firm size, so they control for the influence of size on analyst coverage by sorting 
stocks into groups according to  their residual analyst coverage, where the residual 
comes from a regression of coverage on firm size. They find that, with respect to size, 
once one moves past the very smallest capitalization stocks (where thin market 
making capacity appears to  be an issue) the profitability of momentum strategies 
declines sharply with market capitalization. Also, holding size fixed, momentum 
strategies work particularly well among stocks that have low analyst coverage. 
Further, the marginal importance of analyst coverage i s  greatest among small stocks. 
These effects are of a statistically and economically significant magnitude. 
Momentum profits are roughly 60% greater among the one-third of the stocks with the 
lowest residual coverage, as compared to the one-third with the highest residual 
coverage. The effect of analyst coverage is also more pronounced for stocks that are 
past losers than for stocks that are past winners, i.e. low-coverage stocks seem to 
react more sluggishly to  bad news than to good news. To explain, they use the 
example of a firm that has no analyst coverage but is sitting on good news. To the 
extent that i t s  managers prefer higher to lower stock prices, they wil l push the news 
out the door themselves, via increased disclosures, etc. On the other hand, i f  the 
same firm is sitting on bad news, its managers will have much less incentive to bring 
investors up to  date quickly. Thus the marginal contribution of outside analysts in 
getting the news out is likely to be greater when the news is bad. 
Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) extend the analysis of momentum strategies to 
the global equity markets (similar to  Rouwenhorst, 1998). They implement the 
momentum strategies based on individual stock market indices. Second, they examine 
how the profitability of international momentum strategies is affected by exchange 
rate movements. Third, they investigate whether trading volume information affects 
the profitability of momentum strategies. Their results indicate evidence of 
momentum profits that are statistically and economically significant, especially for 
short holding periods (less than four weeks). The major source of momentum profits 
arises from price continuations in individual stock indices. Evidence also indicates 
that the momentum profits cannot be completely explained by nonsynchronous trading 
and are not confined to emerging markets, although it seems that they diminish 
significantly after adjusting for beta risk. When they implement the momentum 
strategies on markets that experience increases in  volume in  the previous period, the 
momentum profits are higher. This indicates that return continuation is stronger 
following an increase in trading volume. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) investigate both the risks and the possible sources of 
the reward to a short-term momentum strategy which i s  long prior winners and short 
prior losers. They show that the strategy's average profitability cannot be explained 
as a reward for bearing dynamic exposure to the three factors of the Fama and French 
(1996) model, nor by cross-sectional variability in stocks' average returns, nor by 
exposure to industry factors. They claim that the strategy's profitability reflects 
momentum in the stock-specific components of returns. They document that although 
the returns to an industry-based momentum strategy are consistent with an intra- 
industry lead-lag effect, industry momentum alone does not explain the profitability 
of momentum trading strategies. Further, they model and document in a multifactor 
setting the natural and significant correlation between a momentum strategy's factor 
loadings and the factor realizations during the period in which stocks were ranked as 
relative winners versus losers. These dynamic factor loadings induce variability in the 
strategy's returns that can obscure i t s  profitability. When risk adjusted, the strategy's 
profitability i s  remarkably stable across subperiods - even in the pre-1945 period when 
the strategy's mean raw return i s  negative. To address Conrad and Kaul's assertion 
that a momentum strategy's average profitability simply reflects cross-sectional 
variability in  average returns, Grundy and Martin subtract each stock's mean return 
from i t s  return during the investment period, and find that the momentum strategy's 
mean return remains statistically and economically significant. The authors note that 
to the extent that the profitability of a momentum strategy reflects momentum in a 
component of returns beyond that associated with exposure to the Fama-French 
factors, a traditional momentum strategy that defines winners and losers in terms of 
their relative total returns i s  suboptimal. Comparing the profitability of a strategy 
that defines winners and losers in terms of their relative stock-specific (Fama-French 
factors adjusted) returns to the profitability of a strategy that takes longlshort 
positions i n  stocks that are winnersllosers on a total return basis but are not also 
winners/losers on a stock-specific basis, Grundy and Martin find the stock-specific 
return strategy is significantly more profitable than the total return strategy, earning 
a statistically and economically significant risk-adjusted return of more than 1.3% per 
month over the August 1926-July 1995 period (a similar finding was noted in  
Rouwenhorst, 1998). This i s  mainly due to 'hedging out' the reversal of small stocks in  
the month of January. 
Using data over the 1990 to 1997 sample period, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001 
find that momentum strategies continue to be profitable and the past winners 
outperform past losers by about the same magnitude as in the earlier period 
(discussed in  Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). In addition, the January seasonality is al 
observed in  the more recent sample period. The authors note that the behavioural 
models attempting to explain momentum specify that holding period returns arise 
because of a delayed overreaction to information that push the prices of winners 
(losers) above (below) their long-term values. These models predict that the returns 
of losers should exceed the returns of winners subsequent to the holding period. In 
contrast, Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that the higher returns of winners in  the 
holding period represent their unconditional expected rates of return and thus predict 
that the post-formation returns of the momentum portfolio wil l be positive on average 
in  any post-ranking period. To test the conflicting implications of these theories, 
Jegadeesh and Titman examine the long-term returns of the winner and loser stocks in  
the momentum portfolio. Specifically, they examine the returns in  each of the 60 
months following the portfolio formation date. They find that over the entire sample 
period of 1965 to 1997, the cumulative return in months 13 to 60 for the momentum 
portfolio i s  negative. They note that this finding supports the behavioural models but 
clearly rejects the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis which suggests that the winners 
will continue to outperform the losers outside the momentum strategy holding period. 
The authors caution that while they find strong evidence of return reversals in the 
fourth and f i f th years following portfolio formation in  the 1965 to 1981 time period, 
they find weak evidence of return reversals in the1982 to 1997 time period, even 
though the momentum profits are of the same magnitude and significance in both 
periods. In addition, using an improved version of the Conrad and Kaul return- 
scrambling technique t o  randomly scramble the sequence of each stock's returns, 
Jegadeesh and Titman find that very little, if any, of the momentum profits are due to  
the cross-sectional variation in  mean returns (contrary to Conrad and Kaul, 1998). 
They therefore conclude that momentum profits observed in the actual data are 
generated because of the time-series of stock returns, not because of the cross- 
sectional variation in  returns. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) present a direct test of the Conrad and Kaul 
(1998) hypothesis that momentum profits are due to cross-sectional differences in  
unconditional expected returns. Their results indicate that differences in 
unconditional expected returns explain very little, i f  any, of the momentum profits. 
They show that the difference between the Conrad and Kaul results and their results i s  
due to  small sample biases in  the Conrad and Kaul empirical tests. They note that 
Conrad and Kaul's experiments seemingly suggest that the magnitude of momentum 
profits found in the actual data can be obtained with randomly generated data 
constructed to have no time-series dependence. However, Jegadeesh and Titman 
show that Conrad and Kaul's bootstrap experiment and their simulations contain a 
small sample bias that is identical to the bias in  their empirical tests. They present a 
variation of the Conrad and Kaul bootstrap that they analytically show i s  unbiased, in 
which they find that momentum profits are virtually zero. They attribute the Conrad 
and Kaul results entirely to small sample bias. Intuitively, we know that a stock's 
realized return over any six-month period provides very l itt le information about the 
stock's unconditional expected return. Further, the Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1 999) 
finding that there appears to  be l itt le relation between the sample mean returns of 
the industries and the frequency with which they appear in the winners' and losers' 
categories implies that the cross-sectional differences in  unconditional expected 
returns do not account for the profitability of momentum strategies. I wil l also show 
that the industries featured most frequently in  the winner portfolios are often the 
industries featured most frequently in the loser portfolios (similar to  Cao and Wei, 
2002), which casts further doubt on the importance of the cross-sectional differences 
in  unconditional expected returns. 
Cao and Wei (2002) examine return momentums among the fourteen sectors of 
Canada's TSE 300 Index for the period from January 1961 to December 1999. Their 
methodology i s  slightly different from the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) methodology: 
the weight of a winnerlloser sector (above-averagelbelow-average sector) i s  
determined by the difference between i t s  performance over the ranking period and 
the performance of an equal-weighted index over the ranking period. In other words, 
ever sector i s  represented to some extent in their holding period portfolios (assuming 
the sector's return was not exactly equal to the average return for the ranking 
period), with extreme winnersllosers having more representation than others. Cao 
and Wei find a statistically significant return of 0.69 percent per month for the 6- 
month rankl6-month hold strategy, and statistically significant returns as high as 1.05 
percent per month for the 12-month rank11 -month hold strategy. The maznitude of 
these returns i s  surprising given that Cao and Wei examine only fourteen sectors. The 
authors run another version of the strategy which purchases/sells only the top winner 
and bottom loser portfolios, and obtain even-more significant results. The 6-month/6- 
month strategy now returns a statistically significant 1.32 percent per month, while 
the 12-monthll-month strategy now returns a statistically significant 1.59 percent per 
month. This finding is  contrary to the Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) finding that the 
results weren't affected when more industries were employed in  the buy and sell 
portfolios. Cao and Wei find that there i s  a significant difference between the number 
of times the most-frequent-winner industry and least-frequent-winner industry appear 
in the winner portfolio, and the same for the loser portfolio. However, the same 
industries dominate both the winner and loser portfolios, and a correlation coefficient 
indicates that a sector is equally likely to  be in  the extreme winner and loser 
portfolios. They note that momentum returns are largely driven by sectors with large 
return variations. They also find that the overall level of standard deviations (across 
all sectors) determines the overall profitability of the momentum strategy. 
Continuing, the authors find that the betas for strategies that produce significant 
positive returns range from -0.008 to  0.164, many of which are not statistically 
significant. The results collectively suggest that for most of the profitable momentum 
portfolios, systematic risk i s  either zero of closer to zero, and so infer that very l i t t le 
systematic risk i s  borne for the returns earned from momentum strategies. Further, 
the authors note that a momentum trading strategy can be very profitable, even after 
accounting for transactions costs and management expenses. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology used. Section 3 discusses the results of the trading strategies and 
observations made on the winner and loser portfolios. Section 4 recaps the results, 
discusses some interesting observations that are not directly related to the study, and 
concludes on the implications of the study's findings. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Monthly return data for the period January 1963 to December 2003 for twelve, 
seventeen and thirty industry groups was obtained from Kenneth French's website.' 
Kenneth assigns each NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock to an industry portfolio at the 
end of June of year t based on its four-digit SIC code at that time. He then computes 
monthly returns from July of  t to June of t+l. Stocks are value weighted within 
industry groups. The data is used to replicate and extend the Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(1999) study for the three industry data sets. The methodology is as follows: 
1. Industries are ranked and sorted on their J-month returns; 
2. Various strategies are employed which purchase the top-performing H 
portfolios and sell the worst-performing H portfolios; 
3. The holding portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. a 
portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on February 1; 
4. Portfolios are held for K months and the strategy is repeated monthly. 
5. All portfolios are rebalanced monthly to  equal weights so that no portfolio 
has a higher weight in  the trading strategy's total holdings than any other 
portfolio. 
This methodology forms zero-cost portfolios, i.e. portfolios whose long position is 
funded by an equal-value short position. All returns for zero-cost portfolios are 
reported per dollar long. I also examine the returns for the winner and loser portfolios 
individually. Returns for all trading strategies are for the period January 1964 to  
December 2003. Some of the trading strategies require data prior to  January 1964 so 
that the holding period can begin in January 2004. For example, the J=12, K=12 
trading strategy requires data from January 1963 (12 months prior to the first holding 
period) to rank industries on their past 12-month return so that it can begin its first 
holding period in January 1964. An F-test for the cross-sectional dispersion in  mean 
returns in any of the industry data sets cannot be rejected, thereby implying that the 
cross-sectional dispersion in  mean returns across industries i s  insignificant for al l  
industry data sets. 
3 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
3.1 Results for zero-cost portfolios 
Average monthly returns to  various zero-cost (winner-loser) momentum trading 
strategies employing a 6-month lag period and 12-month lag period for the three 
industry data sets are shown in  Table I and Table II respectively. The following 
discussion wil l refer to  Table I unless otherwise noted. Recall that Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1999) examine data for 20 industries with the same methodology. For the 
period July 1963 to July 1995, they find an average monthly return of 0.43 percent for 
the J=6/K=6 month strategy that purchases the 3 (15.0%) highest-returning industries 
and sells the 3 (15.0%) lowest-returning industries. My most comparable trading 
strategy uses 17 industries and purchases the 3 (17.6%) highest-returning industries 
while selling the 3 (17.6%) lowest-returning industries, and obtains an average monthly 
return of 0.33 percent for the same time p e r i ~ d . ~  This significant difference is not 
explained by the following two differences (which are the only differences) between 
the Grinblatt and Moskowitz industry groups and the Kenneth French industry groups: 
1. Grinblatt and Moskowitz form their industry groups every month, while 
Kenneth French forms his industry groups once a year; and 
2. Grinblatt and Moskowitz assign stocks to industry groups based on their 
two-digits SIC codes, while Kenneth 
based on their four-digit SIC codes. 
French assigns stocks to  industry groups 
" The results in Table I are for the January 1964 to December 2003 time period. The exact 
same result was obtained for the J=6/K=6 strategy with 17 industry groups that purchasedlsold 
the toplbottom 3 industries for the January 1964 to July 1995 time period (the Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1 999) time period). 
Table 1 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Winner - Loser (Zero-Cost) Portfolios, 6-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased while the 
bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios are held for K months and are rebalanced 
monthly to equal weighting. The portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio 
ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on February 1. This strategy is repeated monthly for the 
period January 1964 to  December 2003, and the average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in  
this table. Also, F-Statistics for result differences between the strategy that purchases the highest number 
of industries and the strategy that purchases the lowest number of industries are presented. A 'in dicates 
that a t-statistic is significant at the 5% level without Bonferroni's adjustment. None of the F-statistics are 
significant at the 5% level. 
12 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 611 613 616 619 611 2 611 613 616 619 611 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
1 (8.3%) 0.49 0.27 0.38 0.44 0.38 1.76 1.10 1.79 2.3* 2.18* 
2 (16.7%) 0.47 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.31 2.27* 1.16 1.90 2.58* 2.35' 
4 (33.3%) 0.27 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.18 1.88 0.87 1.31 2.06* 1.91 
F-Statistic. 4-1 
17 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 611 613 616 619 611 2 611 613 616 619 611 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (1 1.8%) 0.33 0.21 0.35 0.49 0.40 1.44 1.00 1.91 3.05* 2.62' 
3 (17.6%) 0.37 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.35 1.88 1.32 2.08* 3.07 2.63' 
5 (29.4%) 0.31 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.26 2.09' 1.09 1.82 2.83* 2.54' 
F-Statistic, 5-2 
0.01 0.06 0.35 0.75 0.58 
30 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedlSold 611 613 616 619 611 2 611 613 616 619 611 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 0.83 0.68 0.66 0.74 0.59 3.33* 2.97* 3.20' 3.97* 3.39* 
Table 2 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Winner - Loser (Zero-Cost) Portfolios, 12-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased while the 
bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios are held for K months and are rebalanced 
rnonthly to equal weightings. The portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio 
ranked on returns ending on January 30 i s  formed on February 1. This strategy i s  repeated rnonthly for the 
period January 1964 to December 2003, and the average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in 
this table. Also, F-Statistics for result differences between the strategy that purchases the highest number 
of industries and the strategy that purchases the lowest number of industries are presented. A 'in dicates 
that a t-statistic is significant at the 5% level without Bonferroni's adjustment. None of the F-statistics are 
significant at the 5% level. 
12 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedlSold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
1 (8.3%) 0.62 0.48 0.39 3.29 0.23 2.13* 1.80 1.60 1.27 1.07 
17 lndustries Analvzed 
Trading Stratew (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (1 1.8%) 0.72 0.60 0.54 0.47 0.36 3.19* 2.82* 2.61* 2.33* 1.85 
3 (17.6%) 0.61 0.55 0.44 0.38 0.29 3.07* 2.91* 2.47* 2.22* 1.78 
5 (29.4%) 0.59 0.47 0.38 0.31 0.24 3.78* 3.17* 2.74* 2.32* 1.90 
F-Statistic. 5-2 
0.22 0.25 0.41 0.44 0 2 7  
30 Industries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 1 211 1 213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 0.97 0.88 0.74 0.61 0.45 3.65* 3.53* 3.25* 2.79* 2.18* 
6 (20.0%) 0.86 0.73 0.58 0.46 0.33 4.41* 3.94* 3.33* 2.7Y 2.11* 
9 (30.0%) 0.76 0.57 0.46 0.37 0.25 4.83* 3.79* 3.24* 2.72* 1.95 
F-Statistic. 9-3 
Given this information, it i s  difficult to understand why there i s  a significant 
difference in the Grinblatt and Moskowitz average monthly return and my average 
monthly return over the same time period. However, i t ' s  possible that there i s  a 
significant difference between dividing stocks into 17 industries and dividing stocks 
into 20 industries. For example, dividing stocks into 17 industries might dilute 
momentum profits by combining a high-momentum 'sub-group' of stocks with another, 
not-so-high-momentum 'sub-group' of stocks; this combined group might have been 
separated i f  we were dividing into 20 industries instead. This idea i s  supported by the 
fact that the J=6/K=6 strategy for 30 industry groups that purchases the 6 (20.0%) 
highest-returning industries and sells the 6 (20.0%) lowest-returning industries for the 
same time period has an average monthly return of 0.51 percent, significantly higher 
than the corresponding Grinblatt and Moskowitz finding of 0.43 percent for 20 
industries. 
The first major observation i s  that momentum profits increase significantly 
when fewer industries are purchased and sold. For example, the average difference 
(across 6-month lag strategies) i n  average monthly profits between the 30-industry 
strategy that purchaseslsells the toplbottom 3 industries and the 30-industriy strategy 
that purchaseslsells the toplbottom 9 industries amounts to 3.75 percent per month 
annualized. This i s  a significant incremental annual return by most standards. This 
difference is also present in  the 17-industry and 12-industry data sets, with a 1.29 
percent per month annualized average difference for the 17-industry data set and a 
2.58 percent per month annualized average difference for the 12-industry data set. 
However, we cannot reject any of the F-tests for differences in the means of the 
trading strategies that purchase the highest number of industries and the trading 
strategies that purchase the lowest number of industries for any of three industry data 
sets. Nevertheless, there i s  a clear pattern exhibited i n  all three industry data sets 
except for the J=6/K=1, J=6/K=3 and J=6/K=6 strategies in  the 17-industry data set. 
The higher returns observed for purchasinglselling fewer industries intuitively make 
sense i f  we consider that we take on more risk by purchasing and selling fewer 
industries. By purchasing and selling fewer industries, we are less diversified across 
industries and are more exposed to industry-specific factors, thereby making the 
portfolio more vulnerable to a downturn in a particular industry group that we hold. 
Another interesting observation is that momentum profits for equivalent 
strategies are higher when we include more industries in  the universe. That is, the 
strategy that includes 30 industries in  the universe and purchaseslsells the toplbottom 
9 (30.0% of) industries is significantly more profitable than the equivalent strategy 
that includes 12 industries in  the universe and purchaseslsells the toplbottom 4 
(33.3% of) industries. This amounts to  a statistically significant difference between 
these two strategies of 3.28 percent per month annualized (t-statistic = 2.99). 
Overall, the average difference (across the 6-month lag strategies and across the 
number of industries purchased and sold) i n  average monthly profits between the 30- 
industry data set and.the 12-industry data set amounts to 2.92 percent per month 
annualized. Again, this is a significant incremental annual return by most standards. 
We also observe that all the t-statistics for the 30-industry data set are significant at 
the 1% level, whereas only six t-statistics for the 12-industry data set are significant at 
the 5% level (without the Bonferroni ad ju~ tment ) .~  This finding makes intuitive sense; 
we would expect the opportunity for momentum profits to increase as we increased 
The Bonferroni adjustment adjusts the critical values for t-statist ics upwards for studies that 
run multiple tests over the same data set. It i s  generally accepted that we should expect 
higher t-statist ics in such a study, but there i s  considerable uncertainty about the appropriate 
magnitude of the adjustment. I choose not to use the Bonferroni adjustment because it i s  
controversial and i s  very conservative. However, we should expect slightly higher t-statist ics 
when running multiple comparable strategies using the same data set. 
the number of industries in the universe. Increasing the number of industries gives 
more of a chance for extreme-re'turning sub-groups of stocks to be represented in the 
return for any given industry, i.e. less chance of dilution of the returns of these 
extreme-returning sub-groups by having them grouped with other, average-returning 
sub-groups. While stocks within industry groups are valued-weighted, some industries 
wil l  s t i l l  have a lower average market capitalization than other industries, especially 
in the 30-industry data set. This could increase the chance for a small-cap effect on 
the results of the 30-industry data set, in which case we would expect higher returns 
to the trading strategies. Even so, this finding i s  inconsistent with the Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz conclusion that industries account for almost all of the momentum profits 
observed in individual stocks. If this were true, we would expect the returns to 
momentum trading strategies to remain the same when we varied the number of 
industries in the universe. Indeed, it i s  almost tautological that profits to momentum 
trading strategies would decrease as we decreased the number of industries in the 
universe. For example, imagine the profits to momentum strategies in a two-industry 
universe. The return-dilution effect within industries would eliminate any opportunity 
for momentum profits. While it i s  clear that Grinblatt and Moskowitz have found a 
significant relation between momentum profits and industry groups, industry groups 
can not account for all of the profits to momentum trading strategies. This finding 
begs the question, "what level of industry breakdown best captures the economic 
differences between industries?" 
3.2 Results for winner and loser portfolios 
Average monthly returns to various winner momentum trading strategies 
employing a 6-month lag period and 12-month lag period for the three industry data 
sets are shown in Table Ill and Table IV respectively. 
Table 3 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Winner Portfolios, 6-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased. The 
portfolios are held for K months and are rebalanced monthly to equal weighting. The portfolios are formed 
immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on 
February 1. This strategy is repeated monthly for the period January 1964 to  December 2003, and the 
average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in this table. The Bonferroni adjusted t-stat is 3.36 at 
the 5% level and 3.79 at  the 1% level. All t-statistics are significant at the 1% level. 
12 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (J/K) 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
1 (8.3%) 1.19 1.22 1.33 1.30 1.23 4.77 5.10 5.69 5.66 5.39 
17 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (J/K) 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (1 1.8%) 1.17 1.16 1.25 1.28 1.21 4.80 5.00 5.49 5.70 5.45 
3 (1 7.6%) 1.21 1.17 1.23 1.25 1.19 5.24 5.18 5.54 5.68 5.47 
5 (29.4%) 1.17 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.14 5.46 5.09 5.30 5.49 5.39 
30 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (J/K) 
# Purchased/Sold 6/1 6/3 6/6 6/9 6/12 6/1 6/3 6/6 6/9 6/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 1.58 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.41 6.20 5.93 6.14 6.24 5.91 
Table 4 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Winner Portfolios, 12-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French, Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased. The 
portfolios are held for K months and are rebalanced monthly to equal weighting. The portfolios are formed 
immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on 
February 1. This strategy is repeated monthly for the period January 1964 to December 2003, and the 
average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in this table. The Bonferroni adjusted t-stat is 3.36 at 
the 5% level and 3.79 at the 1% [eve\. All t-statistics are significant at the 1% level. 
12 Industries Analyzed 
Tradins Stratew (JIK) 
- -< . , 
# PurchasedlSold 1 211 1 213 1216 1219 1211 2 1 2 1  1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
1 (8.3%) 1.41 1.28 1.18 1.08 1.05 5.52 5.09 4.76 4.37 4.27 
2 (1 6.7%) 1.38 1.31 1.22 1.16 1.12 6.09 5.83 5.54 5.22 5.04 
4 (33.3%) 1.23 1.18 1.14 1.13 1.09 5.84 5.65 5.53 5.42 5.26 
17  Industries Analvzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedlSold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1 2 1  1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (11.8%) 1.44 1.40 1.28 1.23 1.17 5.90 5.87 5.43 5.21 4.94 
30 Industries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 1 211 1 213 1216 1 219 1211 2 1 2 1  1213 1216 1219 1211 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 1.57 1.59 1.49 1.39 1.30 6.00 6.11 5.81 5.50 5.16 
The following discussion wil l refer to  Table Ill unless otherwise noted. The 
results show that the patterns that were observed for the zero-cost trading strategies 
also exist for the winner portfolios independently (as would be expected). Other than 
a few exceptions, profits increase as fewer industries are purchased and sold. Also, 
trading strategies using the 30-industry data set are much more profitable than the 17- 
industry and 12-industry strategies. The average monthly return for the 30-industry 
data set is 17.46% annualized, while the average monthly returns for the 17-industry 
and 12-industry data sets are 15.25% and 15.12% respectively. Worth noting here are 
the abnormal profits obtainable from the winner portfolios. The buy and hold, 
industry equal-weighting (rebalanced monthly) average monthly returns for the 12- 
industry, 17-industry and 30 industry data sets are 1.00%, 1.00% and 1.05% 
respectively. These returns can be thought of as the passive buy and hold returns, or 
index returns, for the various industry data sets. For purposes of this discussion, I 
define the abnormal return to a trading strategy as the return above the corresponding 
passive buy and hold return. The J=6/K=1 trading strategy that purchaseslsells the 
toplbottom 3 industries in  the 30-industry universe has an abnormal average monthly 
return of 6.6% annualized, while the equivalent strategy that purchaseslsells the 
toplbottom 9 industries has an abnormal average monthly return of 3.2% annualized. 
Collectively, the J=6 trading strategies in  the 30-industry data set have an average 
abnormal monthly return of 3.66% annualized, while the equivalent trading strategies 
in  the 17-industry and 12-industry data sets have abnormal average monthly returns of 
2.30% and 2.18% annualized respectively. 
Average monthly returns to various loser momentum trading strategies 
employing a 6-month lag period and 12-month lag period for the three industry data 
sets are shown i n  Table V and Table VI respectively. 
Table 5 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Loser Portfolios, 6-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios 
are held for K months and are rebalanced monthly to equal weightings. The portfolios are formed 
immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on 
February 1. This strategy i s  repeated monthly for the period January 1964 to  December 2003, and the 
average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in this table. The Bonferroni adjusted t-stat is 3.36 at 
the 5% level and 3.79 at the 1% level. 
12 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 611 613 616 619 6/12 611 613 616 619 611 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
1 (8.3%) 0.70 0.95 0.95 0.86 , 0.85 2.71 3.92 4.18 3.95 4.04 
2 (1 6.7%) 0.76 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.84 3.12 3.97 4.04 3.94 4.02 
4 (33.3%) 0.85 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.91 3.94 4.53 4.54 4.43 4.50 
17 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 611 613 616 619 611 2 611 613 616 619 6/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (1 1.8%) 0.84 0.95 0.90 0.78 0.80 3.17 3.76 3.74 3.34 3.47 
30 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 611 613 616 619 611 2 611 613 616 619 611 2 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 0.75 0.79 0.85 0.77 0.83 2.70 2.99 3.35 3.16 3.44 
6 (20.0%) 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.83 2.74 3.21 3.38 3.35 3.60 
9 (30.0%) 0.77 0.87 0.88 0.84 0.88 3.20 3.67 3.82 3.74 3.92 
Table 6 
Average Monthly Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies (1964 - 2003) 
Loser Portfolios, 12-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups i s  calculated monthly on a 
value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending order 
based on J-month lagged returns, and the bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios 
are held for K months and are rebalanced monthly to equal weightings. The portfolios are formed 
immediately after the lag period, i.e. a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 i s  formed on 
February 1. This strategy i s  repeated monthly for the period January 1964 to December 2003, and the 
average monthly returns and t-statistics are presented in this table. The Bonferroni adjusted t-stat i s  3.36 at 
the 5% level and 3.79 at the 1% level. 
12 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
17 lndustries Analvzed 
Trading Strategy (JIK) 
# PurchasedISold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
2 (1 1.8%) 0.73 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.81 2.80 3.18 3.02 3.13 3.39 
3 (17.6%) 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.85 2.80 3.04 3.24 3.35 3.64 
5 (29.4%) 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.87 2.96 3.24 3.50 3.72 3.91 
30 lndustries Analyzed 
Trading Strategy (JM) 
# PurchasedISold 1211 1213 1216 1219 1211 2 1211 1213 1216 1219 12/12 
Average Monthly Return (%) t-Statistic 
3 (10.0%) 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.85 2.21 2.72 2.91 3.08 3.36 
6 (20.0%) 0.64 0.68 0.76 0.82 0.89 2.54 2.79 3.17 3.45 3.77 
9 (30.0%) 0.70 0.77 0.82 0.88 0.94 2.93 3.25 3.54 3.80 4.11 
The following discussion w i l l  refer to  Table V unless otherwise noted. For this 
discussion, we have to  imagine that we are short the loser portfolios. Therefore, a 
decrease in profits i n  Table V i s  actually an increase in trading strategy profits. The 
results show that the patterns that were observed for the zero-cost and winner trading 
strategies do not exist for the loser portfolios independently. Profits do not 
consistently increase as fewer industries are purchased and sold. We can see that 
profits often decrease when we move from the strategy that purchases the second- 
most industries to the strategy that purchases the fewest industries. This seems to 
imply that extreme-loser industries experience a slowing of their losses in the holding 
period. We also observe that trading strategies using the 30-industry data set are only 
slightly more profitable than the 17-industry and 12-industry strategies. The average 
monthly return across strategies for the 30-industry data set i s  10.16% annualized, 
compared to 10.95% and 11.09% for the 17-industry and 12-industry data sets 
respectively (remember that since we are short, a lower return is more profitable for 
us). Recall that the passive average monthly returns for the 12-industry, 17-industry 
and 30 industry data sets are 1.00%) 1.00% and 1.05% respectively. Using these 
figures, the J=6 trading strategies in the 30-industry data set have an abnormal 
average monthly return of 3.19% annualized, while the 17-industry and 12-industry 
data sets have abnormal average monthly returns of 1.73% annualized and 1.59% 
annualized respectively. Recalling the abnormal average monthly return figures from 
the winners, these results indicate that the zero-cost momentum strategies, are driven 
more from the long side than from the short side of the transaction. 
3.3 High-momentum industries 
Tables VII, Vlll and IX present the frequency of industry appearances in  the 
momentum portfolios for the 30-industry, 17-industry and 12-industry strategies 
respectively. All tables are based on a J=6 strategy. 
Table 7 
Most Frequent Appearances in Momentum Portfolios (1 964 - 2003) 
30 Industries Analyzed, 6-Month Lag Period 
Panel A: Statistics are shown for the frequency of industry appearaces. The proportion of 
industry-months occupied by the industries featured in  the Max, Min, Mean and Median statistics 
i s  displayed in brackets. 
Panel 6: Industries were ranked from 1 to 3 for the frequency of their appearances in  the winner 
portfolios, losers portfolios, and total appearances in both portfolios. An industry's ranking in  
total sample period average monthly return is shown in brackets. Industry definitions are 
available on Kenneth French's website: 
http://mba. tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data-library. html. 
Panel A 
Trading Strategy (J = 6) 
Rank Hold 3 Hold 6 Hold 9 
Winner Appearances 
Max 11 8 (8.2%) 175 (6.1%) 210 (4.9%) 
Mi n 13 (0.9%) 50 (1.7%) 99 (2.3%) 
Mean 48 (3.3%) 96 (3.3%) 144 (3.3%) 
Median 48 (3.3%) 103 (3.6%) 147 (3.4%) 
Loser Appearances 
Max 128 (8.9%) 167 (5.8%) 202 (4.7%) 
Mi n 5 (0.4%) 34 (1.2%) 84 (1.9%) 
Mean 48 (3.3%) 
Median 45 (3.1%) 
Panel B 
Most Frequent Total Appearances 
Coal (16) Coal (16) Coal (16) 
Mines (21) Mines (21) Mines (21 ) ITelecom (27) 
Tobacco (1) Telecom (27) Tobacco (1) 
Most Frequent Winner Appearances 
- 
Tobacco (1) Tobacco (1 ) Tobacco (1) 
Mines (21 ) Telecom (27) Telecom (27)lMeals (2) 
Coal (16) Carry (4)lCoal (16) Carry (4) 
Most Frequent Loser Appearances 
Coal (16) Coal (16) Coal (16) 
Mines (21 ) Mines (21) Mines (21 ) 
Telecom (27) Telecom (27) Steel (30) 
Table 8 
Most Frequent Appearances in Momentum Portfolios (1964 - 2003) 
17 Industries Analyzed, 6-Month Lag Period 
Panel A: Statistics are shown for the frequency of industry appearaces. The proportion of industry 
months occupied by the industries featured in the Max, Min, Mean and Median statistics i s  
displayed in  brackets. 
Panel B: Industries were ranked from 1 to 3 for the frequency of their appearances in the winner 
portfolios, Losers portfolios, and total appearances in both portfolios. An industry's ranking in 
total sample period average monthly return i s  shown in brackets. Industry definitions are 
available on Kenneth French's website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data~library.html. 
Panel A 
Trading Strategy (J = 6) 
Rank Hold 2 Hold 3 Hold 5 
Winner Appearances 
Max 91 (9.5%) 123 (8.5%) 1 78 (7.4%) 
Min 12 (1.3%) 27 (1.9%) 72 (3.0%) 
Mean 56 (5.8%) 85 (5.9%) 141 (5.9%) 
Median 60 (6.3%) 84 (5.8%) 139 (5.8%) 
Loser Appearances 
Max 101 (10.5%) 1 34 (9.3%) 206 (8.6%) 
Min 19 (2.0%) 
Mean 56 (5.9%) 
Median 49 (5.1%) 
Panel B 
Most Frequent Total Appearances 
1 Mines (1 1 ) Mines (1 1 ) Mines (1 1 ) 
2 Clothes (8) Clothes (8) Clothes (8) 
3 Utilities (1 6) Utilities (16) Utilities (1 6) 
Most Frequent Winner Appearances 
1 Mines (1 1) Mines (1 1) Consumer (1 ) 
2 Consumer (1 ) Consumer (1 ) Clothes (8) 
3 Oil (7) Oil (7) Oil (7) 
Most Frequent Loser Appearances 
1 Mines (1 1 ) Mines (1 1 ) Steel (1 7) 
2 Clothes (8) Steel. (17) Utilities (16) 
3 Utilities (16) Utilities (1 6) Mines (1 1 ) 
Table 9 
Most Frequent Appearances in Momentum Portfolios (1 964 - 2003) 
12 Industries Analyzed, 6-Month Lag Period 
Panel A: Statistics are shown for the frequency of industry appearances. The proportion of 
industry-months occupied by the industries featured in the Max, Min, Mean and Median statistics is 
displayed in brackets. 
Panel 0: Industries were ranked from 1 to 3 for the frequency of their appearances in the winner 
portfolios, losers portfolios, and total appearances in both portfolios. An industry's ranking in 
total sample period average monthly return is shown in brackets. Industry definitions are 
available on Kenneth French's website: 
http: //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data~library. html. 
Panel A 
Trading Strategy (J = 6) 
Rank Hold 1 Hold 2 Hold 4 
Winner Appearances 
Max 79 (16.5%) 11 9 (1 2.4%) 196 (10.2%) 
Mi n 6 (1.3%) 
Mean 40 (8.3%) 
Median 38 (7.9%) 
Loser ADDearances 
Max 77 (16.0%) 135 (14.1%) 207 (10.8%) 
Mi n 11 (2.3%) 
Mean 40 (8.3%) 
Median 35 (7.3%) 76 (7.9%) 165 (8.6%) 
Panel B 
Most Frequent Total Appearances 
Business Equipment (5) Telecom (1 1 ) Telecom (1 1 ) 
Energy (6) Business Equipment (5) Energy (6) 
Telecom (1 1 )E nerSY (6) Utilities (1 2) 
Most Frequent Winner Appearances 
Business Equipment (5) Business ~ ~ u i ~ m e n t  (5) Health (1 ) 
Most Frequent Loser Appearances 
Energy (6) Telecom (1 1 ) Telecom (1 1) 
Business Equipment (5) Utilities (12) Utilities (12) 
Telecom (1 1 ) Business Equipment (5 )  Business Equipment (5) 
All three tables clearly indicate that some industries appear much more 
frequently in the momentum portfolios than other industries. This i s  obviously most 
pronounced when we purchaselsell the fewest number of industries. For example, for 
the 12-industry strategy that purchases 1 industry, one of the industries appears 79 
times (out of a possible 480) in  the winner portfolio while another appears only 6 
times. Similarly, for the same strategy, one of the industries appears 77 times (out of 
a possible 480) in the loser portfolio while another appears only 11 times. The mean 
number of appearances for al l  strategies in  both the winner and loser portfolios i s  1 I ( #  
of industries examined). While some industries appear much more frequently than 
others in the winner and loser portfolios, no one industry dominates either portfolio in 
any strategy. The data (not displayed) shows that there is a gradual and steady 
decrease in number of appearances from the most-frequently-featured industry to the 
least-frequently-featured industry in  the winner and loser portfolios for all strategies. 
The tables also show that the portion of industry-months occupied by any one industry 
decreases as we allow the purchaselsale of more industries, as would be expected. 
I t ' s  important to note that an industry can only be selected a maximum of 480 times in 
any strategy (no matter how many industries we allow for purchaselsale), i.e. an 
industry cannot be selected twice in  the same month. Glancing at Panel B in  Tables 
VII, Vlll and IX, we notice that the industries that are most frequently selected for the 
winners portfolio are also most frequently selected for the losers portfolio. Moreover, 
most of the most-frequently-featured industries are considered cyclical and highly 
sensitive to the business cycle. For example, i n  Table IX we see that Business 
Equipment i s  featured as a top-three winner or top-three loser 5 out of a possible 6 
times. Business Equipment includes computers, software and electronic equipment, 
all items whose demand is highly sensitive to the business cycle. For another 
example, in Table Vlll we see that Mines i s  also featured as a top-three winner or top- 
three loser 5 out of a possible 6 times. Mines includes mining and mineral production, 
a commodity business that we expect to experience high cyclicality. So, while no one 
industry dominates the winner and loser portfolios, it appears that industries that are 
highly sensitive to the business cycle are contributing the most to the performance of 
both the winner and loser portfolios, and hence to the performance of the zero-cost 
momentum strategy. However, the fact that the industries that appear most 
frequently i n  the winner portfolio also appear most frequently i n  the loser portfolio i s  
a strong argument against the Conrad and Kaul hypothesis that the profitability of 
momentum strategies i s  a function of the cross-sectional dispersion in expected 
returns. Further, we see that the industries featured most frequently i n  the winner 
portfolios are not the industries with the highest average monthly return in  the sample 
(ranks in  average monthly return in  the sample are shown i n  brackets in  Panel B) . For 
example, Mines, ranked most-frequently selected industry in the 17-industry winner 
portfolios 2 out of a possible 3 times, is ranked only 11 th i n  average monthly return 
over the sample period. A regression of average monthly return in  the sample on 
frequency of winner appearances for the 17-industry strategy that purchaseslsells 1 
industry returns an r2 of 11.3% and an insignificant t-statistic on the winner frequency 
variable. A similar regression of average monthly return in  the sample on frequency of 
loser appearances for the 17-industry strategy that purchases/sells 1 industry returns 
an r2 of 16.3% and an insignificant t-statistic on the loser frequency variable. Slightly 
stronger results are found when we examine strategies that purchaselsell more 
industries. For example, similar regressions on the 17-industry strategy that 
purchases/sells 5 industries return an r2 of 35.7% and t-statistic of 2.9 for the winner 
appearances and an r2 of 36.8% and a t-statistic of 3.0 for the Loser appearances. 
However, these results are hardly an indication that the cross-sectional dispersion in 
expected returns accounts for the profits to momentum strategies. 
3.4 Holding period monthly returns and calendar month returns 
Tables X and XI show month-by-month returns in  the holding period of the zero- 
cost momentum strategy for the J=6 and J=12 strategies respectively. The following 
discussion refers to Table X unless otherwise noted. Notice that returns for all three 
strategies drop off i n  month 2 of the holding period. This effect is most pronounced 
for the 12-industry strategy, where the average monthly return drops from 0.47% in  
the first month of the holding period to 0.06% in  the second month of the holding 
period. Average monthly returns peak in month 8 of the holding period for the 12- 
industry and 30-industry strategies, and month 7 of the holding period for the 17- 
industry strategy. Average monthly returns for all strategies decline steadily and 
rapidly after the peak month, reaching 0.00% for the 30-industry strategy by holding 
month 12. In Table XI we can see that average monthly returns peak in month 1 of the 
holding period and decline slowly and steadily throughout the remainder of the holding 
period. Profits to the 12-month lag strategies are all negative by holding month 12. 
The peak i n  month 1 of the holding period for the 12-month lag period strategy and 
month 7 of the holding period for the 6-month lag period strategy are equivalent, i.e. 
a total of 13 months of evaluation + holding has taken place for both strategies by the 
time these months are finished. However, recall that only one of the 6-month lag 
strategies peaks in  month 7; the others peak in month 8. Note that the 6-month lag 
strategy has a longer duration of profitability than the 12-month lag strategy. We 
might expect this because the 12-month strategy has already allowed the industry to 
outperform i t s  peers for 12 months, allowing more of the profits to be 'used up' 
Table 10 
Month-by-Month Returns to  Momentum Trading Strategy (1964-2003) 
6-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups i s  calculated monthly 
on a value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending 
order based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased while 
the bottom H of industry portfolios (Losers) are sold. The portfolios are held for K months and are 
rebalanced monthly to equal weighting. The portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. 
a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on February 1. This strategy i s  repeated 
monthly for the period January 1964 to December 2003, and the average monthly returns and their 
respective t-statistics are shown for various months in the holding period. 
12 lndustries Analyzed, 2 (1 6.7%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
1 0.47 2.27 7 0.54 2.71 
2 0.06 0.29 8 0.55 2.81 
3 0.12 0.57 9 0.41 2.11 
4 0.32 1.55 10 0.13 0.64 
17 lndustries Analyzed, 3 (1 7.6%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
1 0.37 1.88 7 0.80 4.37 
2 0.14 0.71 8 0.74 3.89 
3 0.20 1 .O1 9 0.41 2.28 
4 0.27 1.40 10 0.08 0.42 
5 0.26 1.47 11 0.16 0.87 
6 0.72 3.91 12 0.03 0.14 
30 lndustries Analyzed, 6 (20.0%) Purchased/Sold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
Table 11 
Month-by-Month Returns to Momentum Trading Strategy (1964-2003) 
12-Month Lag Period 
Stocks are assigned to industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is  calculated monthly 
on a value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in descending 
order based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased while 
the bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios are held for K months and are 
rebalanced monthly to equal weightings. The portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. 
a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 i s  formed on February 1. This strategy i s  repeated 
monthly for the period January 1964 to December 2003, and the average monthly returns and their 
respective t-statistics are shown for various months in the holding period. 
12 lndustries Analyzed, 2 (1 6.7%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
17 lndustries Analyzed, 3 (1 7.6%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
1 0.61 3.07 7 0.43 2.18 
2 0.50 2.53 8 0.16 0.84 
3 0.53 2.71 9 0.18 0.93 
4 0.31 1.56 10 0.03 0.19 
30 lndustries Analvzed. 6 (20.0%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
before the holding period begins. While the J=12/K=1 strategy seems to be the most 
profitable (as i s  also indicated in Tables I and II), the high turnover of this strategy 
(100% turnover per month) would probably eliminate the bulk of its profitability. As a 
combination of high profitability and low turnover, the J=6/K=9 strategy i s  the best. 
This strategy requires turning over only 11.1% (1 /9) of the portfolio every month, or 
133.3% per year, a not-all-too-uncommon turnover for many growth fund managers. 
Table XI1 shows average monthly returns to the J=6/K=6 zero-cost momentum 
strategy in  the calendar months of the year. We can immediately see that there are 
some significant differences in  the results for the three strategies. For example, the 
12-industry strategy experiences a large negative return in  October, while the 17- 
industry strategy experiences only a small negative return in  the same month and the 
30-industry strategy experiences a positive return in the same month. On the other 
hand, the 12-industry strategy experiences a positive return in July, while the 17- 
industry strategy experiences a smaller positive return in  the same month and the 30- 
industry strategy experiences a negative return in the same month. There is some 
evidence for the 'January-effect', or the effect of stocks consistently having negative 
returns in  the month of January (especially small cap stocks), i n  the tables. All three 
strategies experience negative returns in January. Moreover, January i s  the 30- 
industry strategy's lowest returning month; since this strategy is the one most- 
affected by small cap stocks, this makes sense. On the other hand, we can see that 
the 12-industry strategy's fiegative return in  October is more statistically significant 
than its negative return in  January. However, since this study i s  not focused on the 
January effect, I wil l end my speculations here. Most noticeable are the returns in  
June and December. June and December are the highest returning months for all 
three strategies. Moreover, these months outpace all other months by a significant 
Table 12 
Returns to Momentum Trading Strategy Throughout the Calendar Year (1964-2003) 
6-Month Lag Period, 6-Month Hold Period 
Stocks are assigned to  industry groups annually and the return for industry groups is calculated monthly 
on a value-weighted basis, as obtained from Kenneth French. Industry portfolios are ranked in  descending 
order based on J-month lagged returns, and the top H of industry portfolios (winners) are purchased while 
the bottom H of industry portfolios (losers) are sold. The portfolios are held for K months and are 
rebalanced monthly to  equal weightings. The portfolios are formed immediately after the lag period, i.e. 
a portfolio ranked on returns ending on January 30 is formed on February 1. This strategy is repeated 
monthly for the period January 1964 to December 2003, and the average monthly returns and their 
respective t-statistics are shown for the months of the calendar year. 
12 Industries Analyzed, 2 (16.7%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
Jan -0.83 -1 .04 Jul 0.38 0.79 
Feb 1.06 1.50 Aug 
Mar 0.68 1.35 SeP 
A P ~  -0.24 -0.41 OC t 
May 0.24 0.47 Nov 
Jun 1.10 2.58 Dec 
17 Industries Analyzed, 3 (1 7.6%) Purchased/Sold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
Jan -0.50 -0.75 Jul 
Feb 0.66 1 .OO Aug 
Mar 0.12 0.25 SeP 
A P ~  -0.48 -0.84 Oct 
May 0.53 1.39 Nov 
Jun 1.36 2.66 Dec 
30 Industries Analvzed. 6 (20.0%) PurchasedISold 
Month Avg Return (%) t-stat Month Avg Return (%) t-stat 
Jan -0.56 -0.81 Jul -0.03 -0.06 
Feb 0.78 1.20 A% -0.29 -0.62 
Mar 0.79 1.72 SeP 0.55 1.31 
A P ~  0.14 0.23 Oct 0.35 0.68 
May 0.43 0.87 Nov 1.08 2.00 
Jun 1.40 2.94 Dec 1.46 2.87 
margin for the 17-industry and 30-industry strategies and have the most statistically 
significant returns (the 12-industry strategy also has a very high return in February, 
albeit much less statistically significant than its June and December returns). The 
June and December returns account for 46.9%) 70.5% and 61.9% of the total return 
available throughout the calendar year for the 30-industry, 17-industry and 12-industry 
strategies respectively. This is especially noteworthy when we consider that June and 
December are the most statistically significant months for all strategies by a 
considerable margin. 
3.5 Momentum performance in bull and bear markets 
Tables 13 and 14 show statistics on the performance of a J=6/K=6, 30-industry 
zero-cost strategy with 6 industries purchased/sold during bull and bear markets in the 
1964 to 2003 time period. Table 13 shows results versus the 'buy-and-hold' passive 
strategy of buying all industries and rebalancing to equal weights every month, while 
Table 14 shows results versus buying and holding the CRSP Value-Weighted Index. The 
results in  both tables are striking. The following discussion wil l refer to Table 13 
unless otherwise noted, as Table 1 3 i s  the more conservative analysis. While it has 
already been found that zero-cost momentum strategies have virtually no factor risk 
(as measured by the CAPM beta or by the Fama-French three-factor model betas), 
these results indicate that momentum strategies outperform in  bear markets and 
underperform in bull markets. In fact, the only exception to this i s  during the bull 
market of October 1998 to  March 2000, also known as the tech bubble. During this 
period, winners significantly outperformed and losers significantly underperformed t o  
give the momentum strategy 2.1 times the market's average monthly return. 
Amazingly, the zero-cost momentum strategy went on to outperform the market in the 
subsequent bear market of April 2000 to September 2002, driven entirely by the 
underperformance of the loser portfolio. We can see that the zero-cost momentum 
strategy i s  incredibly resilient in time of market crisis. For example, the zero-cost 
momentum strategy returned an average -0.03% per month in the crash of 1987 
(September 1987 to November 1987 inclusive), vs. the market return of -1 1.12% per 
month. This makes intuitive sense; the notion of a 'flight to  quality' in times of 
market crisis means that managers would quickly buy up stocks they perceive as safe 
and dump stocks they perceive as risky. The quick rise in  the prices of the safe stocks 
would create high momentum for these stocks, and they would thus be included in the 
momentum winners portfolio in the second month of the crisis (the return for these 
stocks in the first month of the crisis would likely be so high as to have a significant 
impact on their six-month past performance). These stocks would likely continue their 
momentum throughout the crisis as managers continue to shuffle their portfolios into 
safe stocks and away from risky stocks. The quick fall i n  the price of the risky stocks 
would create the opposite effect for these stocks, and they would thus be included in  
the momentum losers portfolio in  the second month of the crisis. In effect, the zero- 
cost momentum strategy i s  a 'quick-response mechanism' to market price signals in  a 
market crisis. We also see this pattern in  the minor crises of August 1990 to October 
1990 and August 1998 t o  September 1998. Also noteworthy is the winners portfolio on 
i t s  own. The winners portfolio outperforms the market in 6 of the 9 bear markets and 
6 of the 9 bull markets! While we might expect winners to outperform in the bull 
markets, outperformance in the bear markets i s  astonishing. The commonly-held 
perception of long-only momentum investing as speculative seems to be inaccurate, at 
least for the sample period examined. Further, when the winners portfolio 
underperforms in bear markets it i s  always by a very small margin, and usually with a 
standard deviation similar to the market. I wil l remind the reader that the winners 
portfolio achieves an abnormal (defined as return above the market) average return of 
3.17% per month annualized for the time period examined. Moreover, the winners 
portfolio achieves a cumulative return over the entire 1964-2003 sample period of 
29,176% vs. the cumulative market buy-and-hold return of 8,596%. Whiie the winners 
portfoiio definiteiy bears more risk in terms of industry concentration than the buy- 
and-hold market portfolio, this finding is surprising nonetheless. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) find that intermediate-term momentum i s  
strongly related to industry groups. The results of this study indicate that profits to an 
intermediate-term industry momentum strategy vary significantly with the number of 
industries included in the universe and the number of industries purchased and sold. 
For example, the average difference (across 6-month lag strategies) in average 
monthly profits between the 30-industry strategy that purchaseslsells the toplbottom 
3 industries and the 30-industry strategy that purchaseslsells the toplbottom 9 
industries amounts to 3.75 percent per month annualized. Further, the average 
difference (across the 6-month lag strategies and across the number of industries 
purchased and sold) between the strategy that includes 30 industries in the universe 
and the strategy that includes 12 industries in the universe amounts to 2.92 percent 
per month annualized. These differences equate to significant incremental annual 
returns by most standards. This finding i s  inconsistent with the Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz conclusion that industries account for almost all of the momentum profits 
observed in individual stocks. Indeed, it i s  almost tautological that profits to 
momentum trading strategies would decrease as we decreased the number of 
industries in  the universe. For example, imagine the profits to momentum strategies 
in a two-industry universe. The return-dilution effect within industries would 
eliminate any opportunity for momentum profits. While it i s  clear that Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz have found a significant relationship between momentum profits and 
industry groups, industry groups can not account for all of the profits to momentum 
trading strategies. This finding begs the question, "what level of industry breakdown 
best captures the economic differences between industries?" 
The results also clearly indicate that so-called 'cyclical' industries are the most 
frequently purchased and sold industries in the momentum strategies. While we 
would expect these cyclical industries to exhibit the most sensitivity to the business 
cycle, this does not explain why these industries exhibit the most momentum. For an 
explanation of this phenomenon we could look to a combination of Berk, Green and 
Naik (1999) and Hong and Stein (1999). Berk, Green and Naik (1999) demonstrate that 
changes in  a firm's growth options that are related to its systematic risk can generate 
momentum in its returns. Since growth opportunities are likely more correlated 
among firms within industries versus across industries, and likely depend on industry- 
specific attributes, it is conceivable that their model would generate industry 
momentum. Further, Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that slow information diffusion 
into prices causes an initial underreaction to news, but the presence of 'momentum 
traders' seeking to  exploit the slow price movement causes subsequent reversals. If 
we imagine that cyclical firms experience a rush of new information at turning points 
in  the business cycle, it i s  conceivable that the slow incorporation of this rush of new 
information would create increased momentum for these industries versus non-cyclical 
industries. In other words, information related to cyclical industries might come i n  
infrequent large chunks, while information related to other industries may be 
distributed more smoothly over tirne. In addition, there is no significant relationship 
between the frequency that an industry i s  featured in the winner and loser portfolios 
and i t s  average monthly return over the sample period. This is further evidence that 
the factors driving the 'amount' of momentum that particular industries exhibit are 
related to non-return-based characteristics. 
Industry momentum vanes significantly throughout the calendar year, and 
calendar month returns vary significantly depending on how many industries are 
included in  the universe. June and December are by far the most significant months 
for industry momentum returns irrespective of the number of industries examined. 
June and December returns account for 46.9%, 70.5% and 61.9% of the total return 
available throughout the calendar year for the 30-industry, 17-industry and 12-industry 
strategies respectively. 
The zero-cost momentum trading strategy outperforms in every bear market 
and underperforms in  every bull market since February 1966 except the tech bubble of 
the late 1990s. During the tech bubble, the zero-cost momentum trading strategy 
outperformed the market by a factor of 2.1 times, as winners significantly 
outperformed and losers significantly underperformed. Further, the zero-cost 
momentum strategy i s  incredibly resilient i n  times of market crisis, such as the market 
crises of late 1998, late 1990 and late 1987. The zero-cost momentum strategy 
outperforms the market by an average monthly return of 7.65% over these three 
periods. In effect, the zero-cost momentum strategy acts as a 'quick-response 
mechanism' to market price signals in  a market crisis. The results also indicate that 
the winners portfolio outperforms the market in  6 of the 9 bear markets and 6 of the 9 
bull markets (8 of the 9 bull markets when compared to the Value-Weighted CRSP 
Index)! Further, the winners portfolio does not significantly underperform the market 
in any bull or bear market. The commonly held perception of long-only momentum 
investing as speculative seems t o  be inaccurate, at least for the sample period 
examined. With reasonable risk, the winners portfolio achieves a cumulative return 
over the entire 1964-2003 sample period of 29,176% versus the cumulative market buy- 
and-hold return of 8,59696 and the cumulative Value-Weighted CRSP return of 1,423% 
(all returns exclude dividends). This i s  an extraordinary return for a strategy that 
outperforms in 6 out of 9 bear markets, even when considering the strategy's industry 
concentration risk. 
The findings of this study carry important implications for investment managers 
of all types. An investment manager that wants to implement an industry momentum 
strategy has to consider how many industries to examine in  the universe and how many 
industries to  purchase and sell. More importantly, the manager may be limited in the 
amount of choice he has with respect to these variables. For example, the manager 
may have to implement an industry momentum strategy using investment products 
such as exchange-traded funds andlor open-end mutual funds. Alternatively, the 
manager may choose to implement a strategy that evaluates a given set of industries 
and purchases and sells only the five largest companies in  any one industry. Either 
way, the costs and difficulties associated with implementing an industry momentum 
strategy may be prohibitive. A 6-month lag, 6-month hold strategy would replace 
116'~ of the portfolio every month. On top of transaction costs, a strategy that uses 
exchange-traded products might experience a dilution of profits due to the discount or 
premium to net asset value on the exchange-traded products. On the other hand, a 
strategy that uses open-end mutual funds wil l  have to contend with management 
expense ratios and potential limits on the amounts of fund shares that can be 
purchased. Also, a mix of different exchange-traded or mutual fund products i s  not 
tikely to  cover the entire universe of stocks, so that there may always be some stocks 
that a manager can't get exposure to, and these stocks may play an important role i n  
a part.icular industry's momentum. That said, the 3.17 percent per month annualized 
outperformance of the 6-month lag, 6-month hold, 30-industry strategy that purchases 
and sells 6 industries versus the buy-and-hold strategy understates i t s  value in  the 
marketplace. This strategy actually outperforms the Value-Weighted CRSP Index by 
7.96 percent per month annualized over the same period. Even i f  this outperformance 
was cut i n  half by transaction costs, there would s t i l l  be a significant opportunity for 
increased returns for those managers willing to  take on industry concentration risk. 
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